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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
By James L. Goree of the Denver Bar

HE Federal Trade Commission was created by the Act
of Congress known as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, approved September 26, 1914. It consists of five
commissioners who are appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appointive
term is seven years, and not more than three commissioners
may be members of the same political party. The present
members of the commission are Messrs. William E. Humphrey, a Republican, formerly a member of Congress from the
State of Washington, and now serving as Chairman of the
Commission, Edgar A. McCullough, a Democrat and formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Charles
W. Hunt, a Republican and an Iowa farmer, Garland S.
Ferguson, a Democrat and lawyer from North Carolina, and
Charles H. March, a Republican and lawyer from Minnesota.
The powers of the Commission were greatly enlarged by
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, approved October 15, 1914; its
jurisdiction was extended to export trade by the Webb Act,
approved April 10, 1918; its jurisdiction was restricted by
the Packers and Stockyards Act of August 15, 1921, but was
further extended by the monopoly provisions of the Radio
Act of February 23, 1927. At the request of Congress or of
the President, or for the assistance of other government departments, the Commission has made numerous special investigations and reports, such as its study of grain marketing,
of the petroleum and fertilizer industries, of tobacco prices,
and of the production and distribution of coal. During the
war it exercised certain war-time functions and duties, and
certain other war-time duties and functions were conferred
upon it by executive order. Its activities immediately connected with the war were, of course, of great importance, but
as they are not matters of current interest, I shall not consider
them in this paper. The Commission has power to investigate
corporations engaged in interstate commerce (excepting banks
and common carriers) as to their organization, business, practices, etc., and to require reports and information from them
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in that regard. In passing I might say that these powers of
the Commission have been greatly curtailed by judicial decision. I shall address myself particularly to its quasi judicial
functions. They are vested in the Commission by Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Sections 2, 3, 7,
8 and 11 of the Clayton Act.
At the outset it is well to call attention to the fact that
the commerce clause of the Constitution is the basis of the
Commission's jurisdiction; so, with the exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, it has jurisdiction over persons, co-partnerships
and corporations engaged in interstate commerce but has no
jurisdiction over them when the commerce in which they are
engaged is wholly within state boundaries, or as it is sometimes called, intrastate commerce. I ask that this fact be kept
constantly in mind throughout my discussion. There are, however, some persons engaged in interstate commerce over whom
it has no authority, and they constitute the exceptions mentioned above. They are (1) banks, banking associations and
trust companies, jurisdiction over whom is vested by Section
11 of the Clayton Act in the Federal Reserve Board, (2) common carriers subject to the Acts to Regulate Commerce, jurisdiction over whom is vested by the same section in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and (3) packers, stockyards,
market agencies and dealers subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, approved August 15, 1921, jurisdiction over whom
by that act is vested in the Secretary of Agriculture. Under
the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Commission retained
authority to proceed in cases against packers, stockyards, etc.,
in instances where complaints had been served before the
passage of that Act.
By Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful. In his work on Unfair Competition, Mr. Nims thus
defines that term:
"The law of unfair competition is the body of rules created by the
common law of the United States (not by statute) to regulate the conduct
of those striving for good-will for themselves or for ill-will for their competitors."

Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act provides further
that whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe
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that any person is using any unfair method of competition in
commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a
proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest
of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person a complaint, stating its charges in that respect, and naming a time
and place for a hearing. The person so complained of is
designated the respondent, and has the right to appear at the
time and place so fixed, and show cause why an order should
not be entered requiring him to cease and desist from the violation charged. Any person upon good cause shown may be
allowed to intervene and appear in such proceeding. The
testimony in the proceeding is reduced to writing and filed
in the office of the Commission. If, upon a hearing, the Commission is of the opinion that the method of competition in
question is prohibited by the Act, it makes a report in writing
in which it states its findings as to the facts; and issues and
causes to be served on the respondent an order, requiring it
to cease and desist from using such unfair methods of competition. If the respondent fails or neglects to obey such order
of the Commission, it may apply to the circuit court of appeals
of the United States within any circuit where the method of
competition in question was used, or where the respondent
resides or carries on business, for the enforcement of its order.
With its application it files a transcript of the entire record
in the proceeding. Upon the filing of such application the
court causes notice thereof to be served on the respondent,
and thereupon has jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the
question determined therein. Upon the pleadings, testimony
and proceedings set forth in the transcript, the court makes
and enters a decree, affirming, modifying or setting aside the
order of the Commission. The findings of the Commission as
to facts, if supported by testimony, are conclusive. Until a
transcript of the record has been filed in the circuit court of
appeals, the Commission may at any time upon notice modify
or set aside any such report or order made or issued by it.
Either party may apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence; and if such party shows to the court that
such evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such ad-
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ditional evidence- to be taken before the Commission. The
Commission may thereupon modify its findings of facts, or
make new findings, filing such findings with the court, together
with a transcript of the additional evidence so taken, and its
recommendation for the modification or setting aside of its
original order. The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals
to enforce, modify or set aside the orders of the Commission
is exclusive; and their judgments and decrees are final, except
that the same may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon
certiorari.
If the respondent desires to obtain a review of the Commission's order, he may do so by filing in the circuit court of
appeals a written petition, praying that such order be set aside.
A copy of such petition is thereupon served upon the Commission, it then files in court a transcript of the record, and
the case proceeds as in instances where the jurisdiction of the
court is invoked by the commission.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act declares that it shall be unlawful for any person, engaged in interstate commerce, in the
course of such commerce to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities, where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Exception is made, of course, so as to allow discrimination in price
between purchasers on account of differences in the quality or
quantity of the commodity sold, or differences in the cost of
selling or transportation, or discrimination in price made in
good faith to meet competition. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
prohibits the leasing or making a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, or merchandise, or fixing a price charged therefor, upon the condition that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not deal in the goods, wares, or merchandise of a competitor of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such a lease
or sale may be to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. Section 7 prohibits one
corporation, engaged in interstate commerce, from acquiring
or voting stock in another corporation, similarly engaged,
where the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock
by voting, granting of proxies, or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or to
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restrain or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates. It prohibits
interlocking only in instances where at least one of the corporations, engaged in interstate commerce, has capital, surplus, and undivided profits in excess of one million dollars,
and where the corporations are or theretofore have been competitors, so that the elimination of competition between them
would be a violation of any of the anti-trust laws. Section 11
provides that, whenever the Commission shall have reason
to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of
the provisions of Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the act, it shall issue
and serve upon such person a complaint, stating its charges
in that respect. The proceeding is conducted similarly to a
proceeding under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, above detailed, including the method of review by the
circuit court of appeals. If the Commission finds that the
respondent is violating any of the sections mentioned, its order
is that he cease and desist from such violation.
The above is a brief resume of the statutory provisions
relative to procedure. Please note that the machinery is set
in motion by the issuance of a formal complaint by the Commission. No one else can initiate a complaint. An aggrieved
individual, though, may call the Commission's attention to a
violation, and, after investigation, it may issue a formal complaint-in fact in ninety per cent. of the cases the beginning
is the filing of an informal complaint, by letter or other writing, by a competitor who is, or who imagines himself, badly
treated. As one former Commissioner frequently said, "The
injured competitors are the eyes of the Commission." Such
informant must give his name and address, and the name and
address of the party complained of. The identity of the informant is closely guarded and will not be divulged, nor will
any witness be allowed to testify in regard to it. Anonymous
complaints are ignored by the Commission.
As to the necessity of the Commission proceeding to file
a complaint under the Clayton Act or under the Trade Commission Act there is this difference: Section 11 of the Clayton
Act makes a proceeding mandatory if the Commission "has
reason to believe" that the Clayton Act has been violated,
whereas under Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act it has
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more discretion-it is ordered to proceed only if it has reason
to believe that the Act has been violated, and if it is made to
appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it "would be
to the interest of the public." The Commission construes this
provision as making proceedings under the Trade Commission
Act discretionary with it; nevertheless, soon after its creation
the docket of the Commission became crowded with a multitude of petty cases. One reason for this was the early declaration of the Commission that such practices as misbranding,
false advertising, commercial bribery and the like, were
legally and economically wrong, and must be stamped out.
The Commission was undoubtedly sincere in all these petty
prosecutions, though it may be difficult for us to perceive the
public interest in some of the disputes into which it injected
the strong arm of the Federal Government-such, for example, as controversies between manufacturers of an ink-remover, of a millinery glue, and between rival vendors of
orangeade in the District of Columbia. For its participation
in such trivial matters the Commission was severely criticized.
This resulted in a change of policy on its part, so that it is now
its policy to effect a settlement in small cases where the public
interest is not apparent. If the effort at settlement fails, the
parties are told that they must go to the courts for redress.
This policy was set forth at length in an amendment to its rules
of procedure, adopted March 17, 1925, from which I quote
as follows:
"Hereafter it shall bi the policy of the Commission not to entertain
proceedings of alleged unfair practices where the alleged violation of law is a
purely private controversy redressable in the courts except where said practices substantially tend to suppress competition as affecting the public. In all
such cases there must be three parties involved, the respondent, the competitor
injured, and the public. In cases where the alleged injury is one to a competitor only and is redressable in the courts by an action by the aggrieved
competitor and the interest of the public is not substantially involved, the
proceeding will not be entertained."

The statutes make no provision for a pleading by the repondent, evidently intending that the next step would be the
appearance of the respondent at the time and place set for
trial. The rules of practice of the Commission require, however, that within thirty days after service the defendant shall
file an answer, containing "a short and simple statement of
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the facts which constitute the ground of defense." The answer
is the only defensive pleading permitted. The Commission
declines to entertain any demurrer, motion to dismiss, motion
for bill of particulars, or motion to make the complaint more
specific. The Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act
require the respondent to show cause why an order should not
be issued, and contain no reference to the presentation of testimony in support of the Commission's complaint. Nevertheless, the trial counsel for the Commission assumes the burden
of going forward with the evidence. This is undoubtedly
done because the Commission's findings of fact must be supported by the testimony, or the order will be reversed by the
circuit court of appeals. Therefore the assumption of the
burden by the Commission is not as altruistic as it might seem
on first glance.
It is easy to appreciate that the Commission is really a
court. Practically speaking, it is much more. It is the complainant, the district attorney, the judge and the jury-a very
difficult role to play. It must have "reason to believe" that
the law has been violated before it issues a complaint-and
the facts in regard to the alleged violation must be considered
by the Commission, and the question of whether or not a complaint shall issue be passed upon by the Commission, itself,
and not left to examiners, or to counsel for the Commission.
But when the case comes on for trial, the Commission must
forget its preconceived notion of the respondent's guilt, and
make impartial findings of fact, based upon the evidence, and
issue an order thereon. Nevertheless, these are not the only
up-hill features with which the poor respondent has to contend. The Commission has, in practice, taken the position
that it is not bound by technical rules of evidence, and it has
been said that the Commission has never refused to give effect
to testimony on the ground that it was technically incompetent. This is, of course, similar to the practice in cases before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, in which, as one of my
fellow members of the Denver Bar says, "the witnesses argue
the cases under oath, and the lawyers testify without having
been sworn."
As above pointed out, the order of the Commission is
necessarily limited in scope. All that it can do is to order the
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respondent to cease and desist from the objectionable practice
or unfair method, or, if the order concerns Sections 7 or 8 of
the Clayton Act, to divest itself of the stock held, or rid itself
of the directors chosen contrary to law. As above shown, if
the respondent refuses to comply with the order, the Commission must take the case to the circuit court of appeals to get its
order enforced. Feeling keenly this lack of power to enforce
its own orders, for many years the Commission brought additional pressure to bear upon the respondent by enlisting the
aid of the press in giving great publicity to its proceedings,
beginning with its filing of the complaint, and continuing until
an order was issued and the respondent had complied with it.
I am glad to say, however, that this practice has now been
greatly curtailed.
The Commission files no opinions. The report of a case
before it consists usually of the complaint, the findings of fact
and the order of the Commission. In fact, this is about all
that the report of one of its cases could well include, since it
shows the facts and the ruling on them, though the Commission his been severely criticized for its failure to state the
reasons for its rulings. The Commission has, however, issued
conference rulings, which are merely expressions of opinion
on applications for the issuance of complaints and on informal
inquiries, involving the interpretation and construction of the
Trade Commission Act and of those sections of the Clayton
Act with the enforcement of which the Commission is charged.
These conference rulings are added to and amended from time
to time.
There is one other power of the Commission closely related to those we have been considering, which I think it well
to mention. Section 7 of the Trade Commission Act provides
that in any suit in equity brought by or under the direction
of the Attorney General, as provided in the anti-trust acts, the
court may upon the conclusion of the testimony, if it be of
opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer such
suit to the Commission as a master in chancery to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of decree therein. In all its
years of life the Commission has never been called upon to act
as a master in chancery under the provisions of this section.
I turn now to the objectionable practices which the Com-
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mission has power to prevent. In its annual report for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the Commission thus construed its powers:
"Previous to the creation of the Commission, the courts had ruled upon
various forms of unfair practices. Their decisions are designated as cases
arising under the Common Law. But upon the creation of the Commission it
was empowered to leave the shores defined by it, to embark upon an uncharted
sea, using common sense plus the common law for its compass."

But the Commission was wrong. Subsequent judicial decisions have established that. The leading case on the subject
is Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, and,

in line with the decision in that case, the orders of the Commission as to unfair practices have been reversed whenever,
to use its own language, it has "left the shores defined by law,
and embarked on an uncharted sea." Nevertheless the figure
used by the Commission in its statement was a happy one. It
was an admission of an important fact-the Commission was
at sea.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra, the re-

spondents were engaged in selling jute bagging, used for wrapping bales of cotton, and steel ties, used for binding the bales.
Their sales were principally to jobbers and dealers. They
refused to sell ties to a customer unless at the same time he
bought a corresponding amount of bagging. The Commission
held that this practice constituted an unfair method of competition and ordered the respondents to cease and desist from
requiring purchasers of ties to buy a proportionate amount
of bagging. The Circuit Court of appeals reversed the order
of the Commission and the case was brought to the Supreme
Court by certiorari. The Supreme Court made two holdings
which have ever since been used as guide by the Commission:
First,that the complaint must allege facts sufficient to charge
respondents with "unfair methods of competition in commerce", unaided by the testimony adduced at the hearing, and
Second, as above stated, that it is for the courts and not for the
Commission ultimately to determine as a matter of law what
the words "unfair methods of competition" indlude. Said
the Court on these two points:
"If, when liberally construed, the complaint is plainly insufficient to
show unfair competition within the proper meaning of these words there is
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the method of competition specified in the complaint. Such an order should
follow the complaint; otherwise it is improvident and, when challenged, will
be annulled by the court.
"The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the
statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the
commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include.
They are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed
to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or create monopoly. The act was certainly not intended to
fetter free and fair competition as commonly understood and practiced by
honorable opponents in trade."

A lengthy dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in which Mr. Justice Clarke concurred.
In the early years of the existence of the Commission, the
number of cases before it which reached the courts were very
few. In the past few years, however, there has been a veritable
flood of them, many of which have gone to the Supreme Court.
I can therefore consider only the more important ones.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark

Company, 263 U. S. 565, it was shown that the respondent was
engaged in the wholesale grocery business, and for some years
had bought groceries from the Snider Company, a manufacturer of groceries. The Basket Stores Company operated a
chain of retail grocery stores in the territory served by the
Raymond Cormpany, the wholesaler, but, on account of the
volume of business done by its chain of retail stores, the manufacturer had begun to sell to it direct. The Raymond Company thereupon withdrew its patronage from the Snider Company and announced that it would not again purchase goods
from it so long as it sold direct to the Basket Stores Company.
The Commission ruled that this method of competition was
prohibited by the Act, and issued an order to cease and desist.
The order of the Commission had been reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals when the case was taken to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding that a jobber's individual refusal
to purchase from a wholesaler dealing with a retailer was no
more than the exercise of the lawful right to buy or to refuse
to buy, and was not an unlawful method of competition.
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United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U. S. 300, is
a case to which I wish to call your attention. I might remark
parenthetically that it was the Department of Justice and not
the Federal Trade Commission that prosecuted Colgate &
Company-I refer to the case simply to show the law as developed by it. The case was a prosecution under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act for creating and engaging in a combination
of wholesale and retail dealers to maintain resale prices on
commodities sold to them by Colgate & Company. This was
effected by the refusal of Colgate & Company to sell in the
future to dealers who did not maintain the scale of resale prices
suggested by it. The Supreme Court held that in the absence
of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the Sherman
Act did not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. It should be noted that in this case there
was no contract between Colgate & Company and the dealer
by which Colgate & Company attempted to fix the resale price,
nor was there any course of dealing by which such an agreement could be implied-Colgate would simply refuse to supply
further merchandise if the dealer did not respect its wishes in
that regard. The Supreme Court had already condemned
the practice of controlling, or attempting to control, the resale
price by contract as a restraint of trade and had declared it
invalid both at common law and under the Sherman Act.
We now come to the Beech-Nut Packing Company case.
That company, having the benefit of the plans of the other
manufacturers who had been" prosecuted, attempted to improve upon all of them. Its desire, of course, was to fix the
prices at which its products might be resold, so it adopted and
maintained a policy which it denominated the Beech-Nut
Policy. In order to secure the co-operation of its dealers and
to carry out this policy, the company refused to sell to pricecutters, insisted that its customers not sell to price-cutters, and
used its distributors, customers and agents in maintaining an
espionage system to discover who were cutting prices.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered the Beech-Nut
Company to cease and desist from directly or indirectly, or
by any means, bringing about the resale of Beech-Nut products
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by distributors, wholesale or retail, according to any system
of prices established by the Beech-Nut Packing Company.
The Commission was evidently of the opinion that the Trade
Commission Act gave it the power to declare that the refusal
to sell to distributors who cut prices was an "unfair method of
competition". The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit set aside the order of the Commission, and the case
was taken to the Supreme Court by certiorari. The Supreme
Court (257 U. S. 441) reaffirmed the right of a manufacturer
or dealer to refuse to sell goods to persons who would not sell
at stated prices, holding that the passage of the Federal Trade
Commission Act had made no difference in the right of a
manufacturer or dealer in this regard and to that extent set
aside the order of the Commission. It went further, though,
and in an opinion from which four members of the Court dissented, condemned the espionage system and the co-operative
methods by which the Beech-Nut Company, its distributors,
customers and agents, undertook to prevent others from obtaining the company's products at less than the prices designated by it, and to that extent upheld the Commission's order.
I turn now to Section 3 of the Clayton Act. That is the
section which makes it unlawful to lease or sell- goods, wares,
or merchandise on the condition that the lessee or purchaser
shall not use or deal in the goods, wares or merchandise of a
competitor. The Federal Trade Commission perceived a
flagrant violation of this section and of the laws of fair competition in the manner in which the Saturday Evening Post
was being distributed. The Curtis Publishing Company had
originated a system of retail sales through school-boys, and it
employed some fifteen hundred persons as exclusive agents to
train and superintend these boys and to devote their time and
attention to promoting sales. This contract was in writing,
and in it the distributor or agent agreed not to act as agent
for any other publisher, or to supply at wholesale rates any
periodicals other than those published by the Curtis Company,
without the written consent of the Curtis Company. Of these
fifteen hundred agents, 447 were wholesale dealers in newspapers and magazines before contracting with the Curtis
Company. Many of them had requested permission to distribute the periodicals of other publishers, but this permission
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had been uniformly refused. The Commission found that in
these ways the most efficient established channels of distribution had been closed to competitors of the Curtis Company,
competition lessened, and a tendency to monopoly established.
It found no objection to the practice, though, insofar as the
one thousand or more representatives were concerned who,
prior to their contracts, had not been engaged in selling and
distributing newspapers or periodicals for other publishers.
The case finally reached the Supreme Court (260 U. S. 568).
That court held that the form of contract with the representatives was one of agency, and not one of sale upon condition,
and thus disposed of the charges under the Clayton Act. It
also found that the practice described was not an unfair
method of competition, saying:
"The engagement of competent agents obligated to devote their time
and attention to developing the principal's business, to the exclusion of all
others, where nothing else appears, has long been recognized as proper and
unobjectionable practice. The evidence clearly shows that respondent's agency
contracts were made without unlawful motive and in the orderly course of
an expanding business. It does not necessarily follow because many agents
had been general distributors, that their appointment and limitation amounted
to unfair trade practice. And such practice cannot reasonably be inferred from
the other disclosed circumstances. Having regard to the undisputed facts,
the reasons advanced to vindicate the general plan are sufficient.
"Effective competition requires that traders have large freedom of action
when conducting their own affairs. Success alone does not show reprehensible
methods, although it may increase or render insuperable the difficulties which
rivals must face. The mere selection of competent, successful and exclusive
representatives in the orderly course of development can give no just cause for
complaint, and, when standing alone, certainly affords no ground for condemnation under the statute."

There is another point in this opinion which I wish to
mention briefly. The Commission had made findings of fact,
but there were other material facts shown by the evidence
which were not reported upon by the Commission. The Court
held that under such circumstances it could from the record
make findings of these additional facts, without sending the
case back to the Commission for the purpose, saying:
"Manifestly, the court must inquire whether the Commission's findings
of fact are supported by evidence. If so supported, they are conclusive. But
as the statute grants jurisdiction to make and enter, upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings, a decree affirming, modifying or setting aside an order,
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itself the issues presented and whether there are material facts not reported by
the Commission. If there be substantial evidence relating to such facts from
which different conclusions reasonably may be drawn, the matter may be and
ordinarily, we think, should be remanded to the Commission-the primary
fact-finding body-with direction to make additional findings, but if from all
the circumstances it clearly appears that in the interest of justice the controversy should be decided without further delay the court has full power
under the statute so to do."

While not dissenting from the opinion of the court, Mr.
Chief Justice Taft expressed doubt as to the right of the court
to sum up the evidence pro and con on issues undecided by
the Commission where there is a conflict in the evidence, and
make itself the fact finding body. In this view Mr. Justice
Brandeis concurred.
Comparatively early in its life, the Federal Trade Commission had found a practice to be in vogue among the oil
refining companies which it attempted to abate. The oil companies were leasing underground tanks with pumps to retail
dealers at nominal prices upon the condition that the equipment should be used only with gasoline purchased from the
lessor. There was no effort to prevent the retail dealers from
handling the gasoline of other oil companies, the only restriction in that respect being that it could not be stored in or sold
from the equipment of the lessor. The evidence showed that
the percentage of retail dealers so handling the gasoline of
more than one oil company was negligible, though there were
a few that did. So in separate proceedings the Commission
prosecuted some thirty or more refiners and wholesalers, and
ordered them to abandon the practice mentioned. It found
that the practice was not only a violation of Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, but was also an "unfair method of competition,"
not only as against oil companies who did not make a practice
of furnishing such equipment, but also unfair as against the
manufacturers of and dealers in tanks and pumps, and as such
a violation of the Trade Commission Act. The orders in
various ones of the cases were reversed by the circuit courts of
appeals for four different circuits; but, emboldened by the success of some litigation in the lower courts in two other cases
for violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Commission
sought and obtained writs of certiorari,and took the cases to
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the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the prac.
tice complained of was not objectionable, and not a violation
of the Clayton Act or the Trade Commission Act, saying:
"The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no
general authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with
ordinary business methods or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged
in the conflict for advantage called competition. The great purpose of both
statutes was to advance the public interest by securing fair opportunity for
the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire
for gain. And to this end it is essential that those who adventure their time,
skill and capital should have large freedom of action in the conduct of their
own affairs."
Fed. Trade Com'n. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 474.

From these cases it will be seen that in the early years of
its existence the Commission was really trying to take away
the advantages which were afforded by large capital, and to
put all competitors, large and small, on a common level. This
not only brought much criticism upon the Commission from
without, but it was also the source of much internal strife.
The conservative members of the Commission were constantly
and continuously lined up against the radical members. The
general discontent is shown by the fact that resignations from
the Commission have been the rule, rather than the exception,
and only one member of the Commission has ever served a
full appointive term of seven years.
For the greater part of its life, the Commission has been
a catch-all for every dispute arising between competitors in
commerce. The complaining party did not have to come out
into the open and prefer his charges-he merely started the
ball rolling by writing a letter of complaint to the Commission. He was relieved of the burden of employing counsel.
There were no court costs. If his competitor did not obey
the Commission's order, it was the Commission, and not he,
who invoked the aid of the circuit court of appeals. In fact
the Commission was the kind of a big brother worth having.
There are some critics who think that the complaining party
should be made to appear as plaintiff in the action before the
Commission, thus making the procedure before the Trade
Commission similar to that before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. But this could not be done without amending
the Trade Commission Act. In fact it is entirely foreign to
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the idea upon which the Act is drawn. There was no intent
to create a new forum into which competitors could bring
their private troubles for adjustment; the idea of the public
interest was paramount, and in cases where the public interest
was sufficiently clear to warrant the Commission in proceeding, it was the intention of Congress that the injured competitors should be relieved of all trouble and expense. This was
so because the benefit they would derive from the prosecution
was only incidental.
The principal errors which the Commission made during
the first half of its existence were in concerning itself with
trivial controversies and in using too much common sense and
not enough common law in deciding what methods of competition were unfair; and we must admit that during this time
the Federal Trade Commission was a severe disappointment.
The amendment to the rules of the Commission, above mentioned, to the effect that complaints must be to the "interest
of the public," has been a big help and was undoubtedly a
step in the right direction. It is only justice to say that,
previous to interpretation by the Supreme Court of the statutes
under which the Commission acts, its problem was a very
difficult one, and that it has not been slow in changing its ideas
and making reforms in order to conform to the decisions of
that court. The result of this is that in late years, when cases
from the Commission have reached the courts, its orders have
generally been upheld. Let us hope that in the future the
zeal of its members will not cause the Commission to fall into
new errors.

